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How can we regulate the Internet? This seemingly innocent question has been the subject of 
countless books and articles for just over the past 20 years. Part of the reason why it continues 
to be a vibrant and relevant topic is the difference of opinions on what is going on. On the one 
hand, we have those who believe that the Internet is a free and open space that requires no 
regulation, and/or is incapable of being regulated. On the other hand, we have those who think 
that regulation is not only desirable, but that the Internet as it exists now is completely 
regulated because of the prevalence of state surveillance, and that all semblance of freedom is 
a mere illusion.  
I. The Internet 
The Internet has become an integral part of our lives, but if you were to ask the average user 
about how it works, they would not be able to provide any details other than the fact that it is 
a medium to transmit information. This is as it should be; as technologies become widespread 
it is not necessary to understand how they operate—it is possible to drive a car without 
understanding the intricacies of the internal combustion engine.  
However, when it comes to regulating the Internet, it is useful to at least have an idea 
of what lies under the hood, since it is difficult to try to exert some control over something 
that one does not understand.   
From a regulatory perspective, the first element that should be remarked upon is that 
the Internet is a ‘network of networks’1 that operates using common protocols designed to 
ensure resilience, distribution, decentralisation and modularity. It is now part of the history of 
the Internet that started as a military programme intended to create a communication 
infrastructure that could survive a nuclear strike. To achieve this objective, a communication 
                                                 
* Some of the ideas presented in this chapter can be found in my book on complexity and Internet regulation: 
Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation: Scale-Free Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011). This chapter 
is both an update and a reworking of some features of the book.  
1 Jianxi Gao Daqing Li Shlomo Havlin (2014) 'From a single network to a network of networks' 1:3 National 
Science Review 346. 
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network needs to be decentralised, with no central point or governing node. Similarly, 
communications must be able to be broken down and sent through various links in the 
network, only to be put together automatically by the recipient. The network will also be 
made of heterogeneous pieces of hardware that should be able to talk to each other using 
standard communication tools, and everything should have simplicity and modularity in 
mind.2  
The best way to understand the Internet is to separate its architectural features in layers of 
functionality. By doing this, it is possible to identify the various elements with regards to the 
function that they serve. The Internet has four layers: 
1. Link layer. The link layer consists of protocols that allow connection of a host with 
gateways and routers within a network, usually a large area network (LAN) (eg 
Ethernet protocols). 
2. Transport layer. This provides end-to-end protocols for communication between 
hosts in the system, such as the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP).  
3. Internet layer. Because the Internet is a network of networks, every computer 
connected to it must be able to find its components. The Internet Protocol (IP) fulfils 
this function, and is differentiated from the application and transport layers by the fact 
that it does not consist of instructions to reach a destination, or is used to make the 
actual communications, but it allows data packets to reach their destinations by 
allowing identification of participating computers based on their IP address. 
4. Application layer. This is the top communication level made up of protocols for user 
applications such as sending mail (Send Mail Transfer Protocol, or SMTP), sending 
files (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, or HTTP); it also includes protocols used for 
system support, such as that which identifies servers in the system by name instead of 
IP address (Domain Name System, or DNS).    
 
The idea behind the above classification for regulatory purposes is that some elements are so 
fundamental to the functioning of the Internet that they cannot be regulated. The first three 
layers are specifically about communication between networks and computers, and they are 
made up of protocols that have been established by the various standards-setting bodies such 
as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the 
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the 
Internet Society (ISOC). The role of the first layers is to distribute information across the 
networks.  
                                                 
2 B Carpenter, ‘Architectural Principles of the Internet’ (Internet Architecture Board Paper, 1996), available at 
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1958.txt (last accessed 19 June 2018).  
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The application layer is different. Most user activity takes place here, and this is where 
most communication subject to regulation will take place. The standards used to get 
communications from one computer to the other tend to be irrelevant for regulators, other 
than perhaps being of interest from a governance perspective. However, it is the actual 
communications that matter, and these will take place through applications.  
Having said that, the communication layers may be relevant for the type of regulation 
that is proposed. For example, a country that wants to control the flow of data coming in and 
out of its jurisdiction would place technical controls at the Internet layer level in order to filter 
or block content before it reaches its destination.   
II. A Tale of Two Internets 
Perhaps the best way to explain the two opposing views of Internet regulation is by 
contrasting two very distinct case studies that exemplify the difference in experience and 
perception that lead us to see the Internet in such a different light.  
A. The Dark Web 
As it was explained above, the Internet is made up of common protocols that allow users to 
communicate and exchange information with one another. The ‘visible’ Internet makes use of 
the four layers, and it consists of shared applications such as the World Wide Web, email, 
social media apps, games, file transfers, etc. Users connect to the network using the 
communication layers, and they can connect to one another using the application layer.  
Beneath the visible Internet exists a network that not many know how to access, 
known as the Dark Web (or Dark Net). It uses the Internet’s own transport layers, but it 
consists of applications that are shared by a few technically-minded users. This facilitates a 
space that is rarely visited, highly encrypted and seldom regulated.   
James Bartlett describes the Dark Web as follows:  
For some, the dark net is the encrypted world of Tor Hidden Services, where users cannot be 
traced and cannot be identified. […] It has also become a catch-all term for the myriad of 
shocking, disturbing and controversial corners of the Net – the realm of imagined criminals 
and predators of all shapes and sizes.3 
 
                                                 
3 J Bartlett, The Dark Net: Inside the Digital Underworld (London, William Heinemann, 2014).  
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One of the most visible Internet applications is the World Wide Web, and we commonly surf 
through it with web browsers that can read web pages created using the Hypertext Markup 
Language (HTML). However, because the Internet is decentralised and modular, it is possible 
for anyone to come up with new applications and protocols that use the communication 
layers. I could program a new browser that uses my own application protocol, and as long as 
there is someone else using it, then that would still be part of the Internet, but it would be 
invisible for most users.  
One such application is the Tor Browser, which uses the TOR Hidden Service 
Protocol to connect computers that are also connected to the Internet.4 This is a 
communications protocol created by a group of encryption enthusiasts designed to anonymise 
data transferred through the Internet by using voluntary relays and routers that mask a user’s 
identity to prevent traffic snooping and surveillance. By installing the Tor Browser on their 
computers, users can view websites that are not accessible through a mainstream browser like 
Firefox or Chrome.  
The anonymous nature of the Dark Web makes it possible to post any type of content, 
and using anonymous and decentralised payment methods like Bitcoin, users can purchase 
almost anything they desire.5 At the time of writing, it was possible to access pages on the 
Dark Web advertising various drugs, UK passports, US identification documents, hacking 
services, stolen credit cards and hacked social media accounts.  
All of this has led the Dark Web to gain a difficult reputation, coupled by the publicity 
gained in the trial of Ross Ulbricht, the operator of the Silk Road website, a deep web 
marketplace for any sort of illegal material.6  
The presence of such vast and unregulated space tends to lend credence to the idea that 
the Internet cannot be regulated.  
 
                                                 
4 D Dingledine et al, ‘Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router’ (2004), available at 
https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).  
5 For more about Bitcoin, see A Guadamuz and C Marsden, ‘Blockchains and Bitcoin: regulatory responses to 
cryptocurrencies’, (2015) 20(11) First Monday, http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v20i12 (last accessed 21 June 
2018).  
6 J Mullin, ‘Ulbricht Guilty in Silk Road Online Drug-Trafficking Trial’ Ars Technica (4 February 2015), 
available at https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/02/ulbricht-guilty-in-silk-road-online-drug-trafficking-trial/ 
(last accessed 19 June 2018).   
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B. Snowden’s Internet 
Thanks to the series of revelations made by former National Security Agency (NSA) 
contractor Edward Snowden,7 we have a troubling picture of extreme control due to mass 
surveillance conducted by the NSA in the US, and the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) in the UK.  
Although the Internet is supposed to be a decentralised, distributed and open 
telecommunications network, the surveillance revelations have unearthed a much more 
controlled and centralised system than previously thought possible. Snowden left his life as a 
contractor and travelled to Hong Kong where he contacted journalist Glenn Greenwald and 
filmmaker Laura Poitras to whom he gave access to a series of files that laid bare the extent of 
state surveillance.  
The revelations showed a troubling amount of surveillance at all levels, and it is not 
this chapter’s remit to cover these in detail. Following the above classification of the 
Internet’s architecture into layers, it is possible to highlight just some of the issues uncovered: 
1. Link layer. The Tailored Access Operations (TAO) is the NSA’s powerful hacking 
unit, which specialises in breaking into a target’s every communication by tinkering 
with their access points to the network.8 The unit uses built-in backdoors in hardware 
such as routers to tap into people’s connection at the point of origin.  
2. Transport layer. The NSA has managed to tap some of the most important 
underwater cable systems, which make up the very backbone of the Internet.9 The 
tapping is possible because the communications in the transport layer are not 
encrypted by default.  
3. Internet layer. This is related to the above paragraph. It has been revealed that the 
NSA may have had a hand in the lack of default encryption in the Internet layer 
protocols (TCP/IP), as Vint Cerf, one of the fathers of the Internet, has claimed that he 
was stopped by the NSA from including an encrypted protocol into the transport 
layer.10  
4. Application layer. One of the most troubling revelations has been that the NSA has 
managed to obtain collaboration from technology firms to conduct surveillance within 
applications, including allegedly secure and encrypted communications like Skype.11 
                                                 
7 L Harding, The Snowden Files (London, Guardian Faber, 2014).  
8 J Applebaum et al, ‘Inside TAO: Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit’ Der Spiegel (29 December 
2013), available at www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-
global-networks-a-940969.html (last accessed 19 June 2018).  
9 Ibid.  
10 P Roberts, ‘CERF: Classified NSA Work Mucked Up Security For Early TCP/IP’ Veracode (3 April 2014), 
available at www.veracode.com/blog/2014/04/cerf-classified-nsa-work-mucked-up-security-for-early-tcpip (last 
accessed 19 June 2018).   
11 J Ball et al, ‘Revealed: How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security’ The Guardian (6 
September 2013), available at www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security 
(last accessed 19 June 2018).   
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The project Sigint, which stands for signals intelligence, creates partnerships with 
developers and companies to build exploits into telecommunication tools.    
 
All of the above speaks of a much more controlled Internet, filled with taps, exploits and 
collusion on the part of industry, culminating in an unprecedented level of surveillance.  
C. Will the Real Internet Please Stand Up? 
If one reads each of the above two sections separately, then one would conclude very different 
things about the nature of the Internet, and the need for regulation.  
If one were to read only stories about the Dark Web, one would be likely to conclude 
that the Internet is a lawless anarchic space filled with pornography, drugs and illegal 
weapons, where paedophiles and terrorists have a free pass.  
If one reads about the Snowden revelations, then one could conclude that we live in a 
dictatorial dystopia of Orwellian proportions, where shadowy agencies monitor our every 
thought. 
As is often the case, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.  
The Internet presents a space that is difficult to regulate despite the existence of the 
surveillance apparatus described above. While it is relatively easy for most people to be 
identified when they do something online, there is still some level of anonymity in the 
network, and there is growing evidence that any attempt at exercising enforcement online will 
result in increased levels of purposeful and directed anonymisation. For example, a study in 
Sweden found that when regulators tried to enforce new legislation to curb file-sharing, the 
number of users of anonymous services such as proxies and virtual private networks rose.12 
Similarly, jurisdiction continues to be an issue, evidenced by the fact that criminal operations 
move online because enforcement tends to be ineffective,13 and the costs attributed to 
cybercrime continue to rise.14  
                                                 
12 S Larsson and M Svensson, ‘Compliance or Obscurity? Online Anonymity as a Consequence of Fighting 
Unauthorised File-sharing’ (2010) 2(4) Policy & Internet 77. 
13 J Naughton, ‘These Days Crime Doesn’t Pay… Unless it’s Done Online’ The Guardian (29 March 2015), 
available at www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/29/cybercrime-online-government-cuts-crime-
statistics (last accessed 19 June 2018).   
14 R Anderson et al, ‘Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime’ Workshop on the Economics of Information Security 
(Stockholm, Sweden, 2012), available at 
www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2012/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).   
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On the other hand, despite the large surveillance apparatus laid bare by Snowden, this 
has not yet been translated into more control of everyday Internet transactions. Users continue 
to share files infringing copyright, and in general people manage to use the network in ways 
that would be expected even without surveillance. But what is emerging is a more centralised 
experience for large numbers of users, both at the private and public level.  
First, state control is possible – the Chinese Internet, with its built-in filtering and 
censorship mechanisms, demonstrates a more controlled experience for the largest Internet 
demographic in the world. Closer to home, court injunctions15 have successfully blocked 
access to hundreds of infringing sites, such as The Pirate Bay and Isohunt, and while such 
blocking is easily circumvented by experienced users, for the large majority the filtering and 
blocking successfully restricts access to illegal material.16  
Second, the everyday experience of millions of users is predicated on what private 
enterprises show them. As more and more people browse through mobile applications, their 
online experience is defined by the app developer. The level of control that these private 
enterprises hold can be evidenced by the fact that for a growing number of users, the Internet 
doesn’t even exist; for example, in several countries in Asia the number of self-identified 
Facebook users is larger than the number of Internet users, which leads researchers to believe 
that in many territories people mistake Facebook for the Internet.17 
Thus a more nuanced picture of the Internet begins to emerge. A minority of 
technically-oriented users operate in heavily encrypted spaces with near-impunity from 
regulation, while a large number of people suffer constant regulation through censorship, 
blocking and filtering of content. A person’s experience of the Internet will therefore be 
heavily dependent on education, resources and geographical location.  
In other words, the Internet resembles more and more the inequality of ‘real’ life, but 
where the one per cent has been replaced with a techno elite minority.  
III. Regulation Theories 
                                                 
15 A series of blocking orders that start with Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation & Anor v Newzbin Ltd 
[2010] EWHC 608.  
16 eg, this study suggests dropping torrent usage due to the increase in legal streaming use: Sandvine, Global 
Internet Phenomena Report (2013), available at www.sandvine.com/downloads/general/global-internet-
phenomena/2013/2h-2013-global-internet-phenomena-report.pdf (last accessed 19 June 2018).   
17 L Mirani, ‘Millions of Facebook Users Have No Idea They’re Using the Internet’ Quartz (9 February 2015), 
available at https://qz.com/333313/milliions-of-facebook-users-have-no-idea-theyre-using-the-internet/ (last 
accessed 19 June 2018).   
 15 
A. Plus ça change?  
It is a common display of modern hubris to believe that the Internet is new in a fundamental 
way. We see the world around us and notice the impact in almost everything that we do, from 
planning a trip to driving to work. The advent of the Internet was met with some grandiose 
statements about how it would herald a new golden era of prosperity and global 
understanding, an age of ‘computer-aided peace’.18 In 1997, Nicolas Negroponte predicted 
that in 20 years’ time children ‘are not going to know what nationalism is’.19 However, 20 
years on, such statements look laughable.  
The problem is not only a certain lack of imagination on the part of technology 
enthusiasts, but also a lack of historical awareness. Undoubtedly there are many important 
developments both in regulation and communication that have been experienced before, and it 
is pertinent to remember that many of the debates that we tend to think of as inherently digital 
were experienced before during the adoption of different technologies.  
One of the best examples of this is encapsulated in Standage’s seminal book The 
Victorian Internet,20 which draws many parallels between the rise of telegraphy as a means of 
communication in the nineteenth century, and the rise of the Internet. These parallels include 
the misuse of the technology for fraudulent purposes, the creation of a highly-skilled technical 
class of users and operators and the social changes that it brought.    
Our current obsession with technology is often similar to earlier debates about the role 
of communication and media in society. In a now famous Newsweek cover in 1970, the 
magazine asked whether privacy was dead, with a cartoon depicting an anxious couple 
harassed by computers, telephones, cameras and microphones.21 One could easily update that 
cover with modern concerns such as smartphones, CCTV and drones.  
As early as 1983, Ithiel de Sola Pool was already discussing some of the social 
changes and the societal implications of electronic communication before the digital era, 
identifying key elements about media ownership, distance, centralisation, and privacy. In his 
book Technologies of Freedom, he wrote:  
                                                 
18 M Dertouzos, What Will Be: How the World of Information Will Change (New York, Harper Collins, 1997).  
19 ‘Negroponte: Internet is Way to World Peace’ CNN (25 November 1997), available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/TECH/9711/25/internet.peace.reut/ (last accessed 19 June 2018). 
20 T Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Centuryʼs on-
Line Pioneers (San Francisco, Berkley Books, 1999).  
21 The cover can be found at https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-privacy-dead (accessed 21 June 2018). 
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The exercise of regulation and control over communication is a central concern in any treatise 
of freedom. How much control are policy makers allowed to exercise? What are the limitations 
on them […]? May they censor? May the license those who seek to communicate? What 
norms control the things that communicators may say to each other? What is libel, what is 
slander, what violates privacy or security? Who is chose to enforce these rules and how?22 
 
These questions are just as relevant today; one could easily ask them of the phenomenon of 
social media. It is logical that we should consider similar questions concerning the regulation 
of technology, because the very act of regulation hinges on the issues of power and control, 
and these do not tend to change with different technologies. What changes are the players, 
and to a large extent the subject of regulation.  
Braman makes an excellent point when talking about the changing regulatory 
landscape as seen by those who are subject to regulation.23 She comments that in the pre-
digital era, media regulation used to be directed almost exclusively at professional entities and 
organisations. With the Internet, we are witnessing a democratisation of the application of 
media policy and regulation in fields such as defamation and copyright. Therefore, Internet 
regulation has shifted from concerns about direct regulation and has moved towards 
discussion about intermediary liability.24   
So, while many of the themes of Internet regulation may remain the same over the 
years, we can begin to identify unique features that make the Internet subject to different 
rules, raising the question of whether it is possible to regulate it at all.  
B. The Return of Cyber-Libertarianism 
The idea of the Internet as a separate space subject to different laws and regulations is as old 
as the term Cyberspace. In some of the most influential science fiction depictions of virtual 
realities in novels like Neuromancer,25 Snow Crash,26 and Ready Player One,27 the Internet 
tends to be depicted as an almost different physical reality that is subject to its own rules.   
                                                 
22 I de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1983) 9.  
23 S Braman, ‘Where has Media Policy Gone? Defining the Field in the Twenty-First Century’ (2004) 9(2) 
Communication Law and Policy 153. 
24 See, eg, D Mac Sithigh, ‘The Fragmentation of Intermediary Liability in the UK’ (2013) 8(7) Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 521. 
25 W Gibson, Neuromancer (London, Harper Collins, 2011).  
26 N Stephenson, Snow Crash (London, Penguin, 1994). 
27 E Cline, Ready Player One (London, Arrow, 2012). 
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The early Web did feel a bit like an unregulated frontier, particularly because 
regulators were slow to respond and were very much taken aback by the potential of the new 
technology and the appearance of a global communications network that seemed to be 
immune from regulation. In an often-cited work on the topic, lyricist John Perry Barlow wrote 
his Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, in which he set out to attack government 
intervention in Cyberspace, favouring a quasi-libertarian self-regulated approach. He wrote: 
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a standing 
wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, 
but it is not where bodies live. [...] Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot 
obtain order by physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and 
the commonweal, our governance will emerge.28 
 
Barlow believed that Internet communities would be able to exercise self-regulatory control 
because governments would not be able to intervene.  
Other commentators and scholars adopted Barlow’s ideas in the late 1990s, believing 
that it would be difficult to subject the Web to traditional regulatory methods. The 
understanding at the time was that the Internet could not be controlled in any effective 
manner, and so several models of self-regulation were proposed that were intended to 
organise the network in some coherent fashion.29 Of note amongst these theories is Post and 
Johnson’s Net Federalism.30 They argued that Cyberspace is a separate entity clearly bordered 
with the physical world, and consequently it should be treated as an independent regulatory 
sphere for all legal purposes. Because the Internet would still require some form of regulation, 
they argued that the Web should be able to assemble its own legal institutions in a manner 
similar to the creation of federal states brought together under a unifying ideal. These self-
regulated federal ‘states’ would generate their own sets of rules consistent with practice in 
that part of Cyberspace.31  
While some of the arguments in favour of cyber-libertarianism might be persuasive, 
Barlow, Post and Johnson completely underestimated the regulatory push from governments 
                                                 
28 JP Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1996), 
available at www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence (last accessed 19 June 2018).  
29 A comprehensive review of most of these ideas can be found in G Greenleaf, ‘An Endnote on Regulating 
Cyberspace: Architecture vs Law?’ (1998) 21(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 593, available at 
www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLJ/1998/52.html (last accessed 19 June 2018). 
30 DR Johnson and DG Post, ‘Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 48 Stanford Law 
Review 1367.  
31 Other works of note are J Reidenberg, ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules through 
Technology’ (1998) 76 Texas Law Review 553; and J Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the 
Construction of the Information Society (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1996).    
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and international organisations that would take place.32 Even back in the late 1990s, several 
authors criticised the cyber-libertarian ideas of unregulated spaces. In particular, Boyle33 
seems to have understood that the premise behind the theories of the impossibility of 
exercising any credible governance over Cyberspace was not only wrong-headed, but rested 
on completely untested hypotheses. In his view, cyber-libertarianism was blind to the many 
avenues of control available to public regulators.  
Nonetheless, cyber-libertarianism continues to endure even to this day. Part of its 
baffling resilience might arise from the sense of regulatory despair that is often awakened 
when new technological changes take place. It is interesting how the ‘Internet cannot be 
regulated’ mantra is resurrected every few years when we are presented with a new advance 
online. This was true of virtual worlds, peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing, 3D printing, social 
networks, cryptocurrencies and wearable technology, to name just a few examples.34 When 
presented with challenges, many tend to revert to a cyber-libertarian default, declaring the 
new technology as impossible to regulate. This enduring feature of cyber-libertarianism may 
be fuelled by nothing more than unfamiliarity with either the new technologies or the history 
of the Web. As the Internet matures, it seems like every new generation believes that its 
online experience is unique to the one that came before it.   
But the real reason for the return of cyber-libertarianism may be more normative than 
descriptive. With Snowden’s revelations, we are being presented with a dystopian 
surveillance apparatus that does not resemble the free and open Internet ideal that was 
originally envisaged. On this view, it is not so much that the Internet cannot be regulated, but 
that it should not be regulated. Snowden has given us the perfect excuse, if any was needed, to 
further distrust regulatory structures. During the closing statements at the 2014 Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) in Istanbul, Milton Mueller proposed that Barlow was worth a 
second look, and postulated the idea of an Internet Nation: 
Barlow’s idea that the internet was immune from control by existing governments has been 
discredited. But remember, Barlow drafted a declaration of independence. Such a declaration 
does not necessarily mean that existing nations have no power; it means that the residents of 
cyberspace want a distinct nation of their own. […] There is nothing terribly crazy or 
controversial about the concept of an Internet community. Clearly, the Internet provides the 
basis for a community with its own interests, an incipient identity, its own norms and modes of 
                                                 
32 eg, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaties. See J Sheinblatt, ‘The WIPO 
Copyright Treaty’ (1998) 13 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 535.  
33 J Boyle, ‘Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors’ (1997) 66 University 
of Cincinnati Law Review 177.  
34 See, eg, A Guadamuz, ‘Back to the Future: Regulation of Virtual Worlds’ (2007) 4(3) SCRIPTed 242. 
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living together. And it is only a small step from community to nation. A nation is just a 
community that wants its own state.35 
 
This is perhaps a proposition that requires a second look. Many of those who laughed at the 
idea of cyber-libertarianism did so from the perspective that it clashed with practice, and that 
governments seemed quite adept at regulating certain aspects of the online experience. But 
perhaps we were asking the wrong question, and we should now be asking whether such 
regulation is desired.  
C. Regulating the Gateways 
While cyber-libertarianism may be experiencing a comeback, it still needs to confront the 
cold reality of power struggles. The rise of Napster in 1999 and the later emergence of P2P 
file-sharing networks,36 served as clear reminders of the difficulties of enforcing the law in 
the digital domain. The near-limitless availability of illicit materials online coupled with the 
widespread availability of infringing content gave the impression that the Internet was a 
medium where no regulation was possible. Nonetheless, despite the glaring failure in shutting 
down file-sharing networks, the early years of the twenty-first century witnessed the 
deployment of relatively successful regulatory approaches by many national governments.  
The landscape of Internet regulation up until around 2000 was a mixture of cyber-
libertarianism and half-hearted legislative solutions. The Internet was a global, distributed and 
borderless network because it had been designed as such. It also demonstrated resilience 
because of its origins as a military network whereby its design meant that communications 
could easily route around damage to any one node in the network. Castells describes this as 
‘architecture of openness’.37 Vint Cerf, one of the fathers of the modern Web, went as far as 
stating that the Internet traffic was ‘totally unbound with respect to geography’.38  
However, as Goldsmith and Wu rightly point out, this initial architecture was not 
entirely set in stone, and unsurprisingly, it soon became clear that national governments were 
                                                 
35 M Mueller, ‘Internet Nation?’ (Internet Governance Project, 5 September 2014), available at 
www.internetgovernance.org/2014/09/05/internet-nation/ (last accessed 19 June 2018).   
36 See S Smith, ‘From Napster to Kazaa: The Battle over Peer-to-Peer Filesharing Goes International’ (2003) 
Duke Law & Technology Review 8. 
37 M Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on Internet, Business, and Society (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 26.  
38 As cited by L Guernsey, ‘Welcome to the Web. Passport, Please?’ New York Times (15 March 2001), 
available at www.nytimes.com/2001/03/15/technology/welcome-to-the-web-passport-please.html (last accessed 
19 June 2018). 
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attempting to draw borders in Cyberspace.39 The most successful attempt to do so was the 
segregation of the Internet into national intranets. While the Internet was supposed to be 
globally distributed, several countries started redesigning the entry points into their national 
networks in order to impose screening mechanisms that would allow them to filter out 
undesired content.  
This state of affairs is a logical result of the manner in which the Internet grew. While 
the global architecture of the Internet as a distributed network still holds true because of the 
existence of routers and distributed protocols, the actual physical Internet is often centralised. 
In the early days of the Internet, a lot of information was spread through the telephone 
network, which ensured a high, albeit expensive, distribution ratio.40 Later, a high-speed 
backbone had to be built to accommodate larger amounts of information being spread 
throughout the system, first copper cables and satellites, and later optical cables.41 The end 
result was a more centralised Internet than was originally envisaged, as the router distribution 
worked within connected nodes. This can be explained using the UK as an example: the 
country has many roads, but not being connected to continental Europe, it relies on ports and 
airports as communication hubs. The modern Internet looks something like that, with physical 
connections akin to ports where most of the information comes through, and then it is 
distributed using routers and hosts in the manner in which it was intended. Many countries 
have reduced the number of physical entry points to their internal networks, effectively 
creating Internet chokepoints. If a government controls these gateways, then it will be easier 
to exercise control over the Internet in that particular country as a whole.  
Unfortunately, there are a growing number of examples of just how effective such 
chokepoint regulation may be. By far the best example of this is the so-called Great Firewall 
of China, known there as the Golden Shield Project. The Great Firewall is a multi-layered 
technological solution that takes advantage of the fact that the Chinese Government controls 
the few Internet gateways into the larger Chinese Internet. This allows the Government to 
impose effective filtering restrictions to incoming Internet traffic by various means. The most 
crucial is the filtering of IP addresses originating from blacklisted services, which range from 
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Blogger to Sex.com.42 While this is in no way a perfect system, it does allow the Chinese 
Government a level of influence that was thought impossible with the distributed architecture. 
The Great Firewall works by deploying hardware routers at each of the entry points into the 
country. These routers are given lists of banned IP addresses, so when an Internet host within 
China makes a request to access a banned site, the router does not forward the request to the 
target host, so the site appears not to exist, and a network error message is returned to the 
client.43   
Another well-documented phenomenon was the disconnection of the Egyptian Internet 
during the Arab Spring. On 27 January 2011 at around 10.30 GMT, the entire Egyptian 
Internet was disconnected from the rest of the world by Egyptian authorities to respond to 
widespread protests that were made using social media to communicate and organise.44 This 
was possible because Egypt, like many other countries in the Middle East, has a national 
firewall consisting of an extra layer of Internet servers that mediate all traffic in and out of the 
country through servers running the appropriately named Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). 
Egyptian authorities managed simultaneously to shut down 3,500 BGP routes into the 
country, which meant that more than 90 per cent of all traffic in and out of the country could 
not get through.45  
Therefore, it has become clear then that the most effective regulatory solution to 
online content is to exercise control at the access points. This regulation model has been 
replicated in many other countries,46 proving that the Internet is decreasingly distributed, and 
looks increasingly like a network of self-enclosed city states with connecting ports.      
Moreover, private enterprises have been co-opted as regulators of their own 
environments, in what Laidlaw describes as gatekeepers.47 She identifies two types of 
gatekeepers—those who broadly control the flow of information, and what she calls Internet 
information gatekeepers, who ‘as a result of the control impact participation and deliberation 
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in the democratic culture’.48 Under this framework, large parts of the online environment 
become regulated by private entities through end-user licence agreements and terms of use, 
where the gatekeeper can unilaterally remove content with little recourse to the creator. The 
role of intermediaries as gatekeepers becomes an integral part of the regulatory arsenal, and 
makes it difficult to sustain the contention that the Internet is an environment devoid of any 
control.  
It must be pointed out that the regulation at the gateway level has interesting side 
effects for regulatory purposes. The first interesting characteristic is a less decentralised and 
highly balkanised system where countries exercise internal control. The second is that private 
enterprises exercise an increasingly powerful level of control over their users, either at the 
prompting of government, or on behalf of other private actors. The result is a much more 
centralised environment that does not conform to cyber-libertarian ideals.    
D. Code 
Since its publication in 1999, Lessig’s Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace49 has become one 
of the more influential books on Internet regulation. In it he postulates that there are four main 
modes of regulation, namely markets, norms, law and architecture.50 Most theories of 
regulation up until then accounted for the first three. Lessig’s breakthrough came in the way 
in which he identified the prevalence of architectural regulation in technological settings. 
Lessig argued that the Internet itself is highly dependent on the technological architecture that 
sustains it, the ‘code’ in which it is written, the connectivity layers between domains, the 
protocols used in order to distribute information from one computer to another, the functional 
layers of said protocols, the domain name server system that tells one computer’s location in 
the system, and so on.51 Whether the Internet can be subject to regulatory control will depend 
entirely on its underlying architecture. For example, some of the constituent code of the 
Internet is open, that is, it can be inspected, copied and modified by all sorts of people. This 
code cannot easily be subject to government regulation. However, the protocols and 
communication tools that make up the online world are more critical than the underlying code 
because they are needed for connectivity to take place. Whoever controls the underlying 
‘plumbing’, and the protocols, thus controls the Internet. 
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But who writes the code? Lessig’s architectural regulation suggests the existence of 
some form of self-ordering mechanism. He identifies the ‘invisible hand’ of cyberspace that 
exerts an ordering force into the architecture of the Internet: 
Control. Not necessarily control by government, and not necessarily control to some evil, 
fascist end. But the argument of this book is that the invisible hand of cyberspace is building 
an architecture that is quite the opposite of its architecture at its birth. This invisible hand, 
pushed by government and by commerce, is constructing an architecture that will perfect 
control and make highly efficient regulation possible.52 
 
Nonetheless, Lessig’s version of the invisible hand of cyberspace is limited in that he believes 
that it is shaped by code. So, programmers, regulators and policymakers can make conscious 
decisions that shape what the underlying architecture will look like, hence exercising real 
control over the shape of the Web.53 This version of self-organisation is, as a result, limited by 
conscious decisions, and while Cyberspace may reach its own efficient regulation, it can be 
subject to change. 
While the original text has been updated,54 and some of the examples feel dated, the 
work is still as relevant today as it was back then. As the years pass, and more technology 
developments arise and evolve, it becomes more evident that architectural decisions made at 
the outset of the development of a technology have huge implications about how it is going to 
be regulated.  
A great example of an architectural decision that has had huge implications is one of 
the building blocks of the Internet, the TCP/IP protocol suite. The suite is designed to allow 
packets of information to reach the intended recipient, but it has a well-documented flaw,55 
namely a lack of authentication. This allows a range of common attacks, such as so-called ‘IP 
spoofing’, whereby a malicious user pretends to be sending data from an IP address other than 
its own. Because there is little authentication, the network assumes that it is coming from that 
address.56 This security fault has also made mass surveillance easier, prompting accusations 
that such an oversight was a purposeful decision in order to make such control possible. Vint 
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Cerf has even admitted that there were proposals to create a network encryption layer, but that 
it would require the use of encryption technology which at the time was restricted.57 
The TCP/IP authentication vulnerability is a great example of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the code regulation model. At its heart, the code model relies on the informed 
decision of coders and policymakers, and we are expected to believe that they will make the 
best decisions. But this is not always the case. It is possible for regulators to build bad code 
into the system, and developers are humans and make mistakes as well. We may also code 
into place solutions that do not work, or are misguided. Brown and Marsden make this point 
in their book Regulating Code. They write: 
Regulation by code can increase the efficacy of regulation but should not be seen as a panacea. 
Copyright holders’ hopes that ‘the answer to the machine is in the machine’ led them to waste 
almost twenty years attempting to enforce scarcity-based business models rather than innovate 
toward the ‘celestial jukebox’ that is finally emerging in products such as Spotify. Code is 
fundamentally a non-state-designed response that can lead to more effective solutions but will 
tend to undervalue the public interest and lack democratic legitimacy.58  
 
Thus, code can be an empowering regulatory tool, but it can also often be misused, wittingly 
or otherwise. There is no such thing as an invisible hand of Cyberspace, but we are presented 
with a model in which programmers, regulators and policymakers make conscious decisions 
that shape the underlying architecture of the Internet. These decisions are in turn limited by 
existing technology, but also by other constraints such as the basic online structures.  
It would be possible to think of code more as a regulation hierarchy, akin to the 
Kelsen’s pyramid with constitutional norms at the top.59 At the top of the Internet code 
pyramid are the foundational protocols, such as the TCP/IP suite, which gives us a clear case 
of a conscious architectural decision. All other Internet protocols tend to rest on the 
foundational ones, and therefore must respond to the existing characteristics of the network. 
Developers can make decisions, but those have to respond to the existing constraints.  
IV. Complexity and Self-Organisation 
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All of the above theories explain different parts of the problem of online regulation. The 
resistance of various corners of the Internet to regulation can explain the baffling endurance 
of cyber-libertarianism. It is also evident that the regulation of gateways and chokepoints has 
had an effect in exercising some form of control over the network. Code can help to explain 
how some behaviour is built into the system’s architecture.  
It has been the contention of the author in several works that the Internet is a complex 
network that displays self-organising characteristics.60 Assuming that the Internet is a 
complex adaptive system subject to self-organisation,61 one might postulate that any attempt 
to regulate specific elements within the network will have to take into account this important 
emergent attribute of the global communication system. Moreover, it may not be possible to 
regulate adequately online environments that display self-organising characteristics without 
some knowledge of the empirical and theoretical features of such environments.   
The network is made up of nodes and links that grow according to power laws.62 Older 
links in the network accumulate more links, and those successful nodes in turn tend to 
accumulate more links themselves, creating a ‘the rich get richer’ situation. The resulting 
hubs serve as important connectors within the network, which in turn explains the seemingly 
ordered nature of the system. The nodes themselves often cluster into small world networks 
where the intervening pathways between nodes tend to be short. The network is fractal in 
nature, meaning it has the same architectural features be it on a large or short scale, hence the 
suggestion that it is scale-free.  
The scale-free nature of the network makes the Internet resilient to random attacks. 
However, this also means that other undesired networks which exist within cyberspace are 
also robust, such as P2P file-sharing networks, ransomware, or cybercrime rings. Similarly, 
because of architectural decisions made early on, the network displays high levels of 
centrality at the national scale.  
All of these features, amongst others, offer strong evidence that self-organising forces 
operate online. Any regulatory effort that ignores this fact is faced with severe difficulties, as 
                                                 
60 See A Guadamuz, Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation (n *).  
61 Understood as a system that is capable of organising itself, see SA Kauffman, At Home in the Universe: The 
Search for Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).  
62 A power law is a mathematical expression that happens ‘when the probability of measuring a particular value 
of some quantity varies inversely as a power of that value’. See MEJ Newman, ‘Power Laws, Pareto 
Distributions and Zipf’s Law’ (2005) 46(5) Contemporary Physics 323, 323.   
 26 
the same self-organising forces that shape the Internet’s architecture are also working to 
undermine and even defeat regulatory action.  
The father of self-organisation studies in social systems is Niklas Luhmann, 
particularly his influential theory of autopoiesis.63 In its broadest sense, Luhmann’s theory of 
autopoiesis matches what we have witnessed online, as he defines it as social systems that 
respond to internal stimuli instead of relying on external elements; these elements come 
together to generate stability in the system. It is a common misunderstanding that self-
organisation causes chaos,64 when in reality most chaotic systems tend towards stability in the 
long run, much in line with what are known as ‘fitness landscapes’.65 If we think of the 
Internet as an autopoietic system, then we should conclude that it becomes organised because 
the interaction of its parts favours clustering and stability in order to manage complexity.  
When presented with autopoietic systems, regulation theories have two possible 
strategies. One could accept that the network responds to its own self-organising elements, 
and therefore cannot be governed. If this is the case, then regulation is not possible. The 
postulated theory of self-organisation of the Internet adopts the opposite view, that self-
regulation need not mean that governance of the system is impossible. While this may be 
optimistic, it is the only viable avenue to take if one wishes to undertake regulatory efforts. To 
fail to do this would be to fall prey to an anarchic and/or cyber-libertarian view of 
governance, where everything is left to the self-organising powers of the system. Even in the 
face of contradictory evidence, I adopt an optimistic view of regulation, and will assume that 
some form of order outside of the regulatory effort is possible.  
Within the optimistic regulatory philosophy, we could try to build the system to fit the 
regulatory goals. Following the idea presented in Lessig’s Code,66 regulation strategies can be 
built into the system, assuming that this will seed the elements around which self-organisation 
will occur. As stated, complex systems will usually order themselves at fitness peaks of 
higher order. If we know how self-organisation works within the network, then we can try to 
code situations that will constitute fitness peaks in the overall landscape.  
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There are two examples that serve to illustrate opportunities for engineered self-
organisation. First, in the fight against P2P file-sharing, it seems evident that the networks are 
robust self-organising entities. But what would happen if one built a network architecture that 
specifically targets such networks? While there have been some attempts to attack the 
networks in this manner, perhaps more strict legislation that tackles not the infringers, but the 
architecture, would have more chance of success. Second, some forms of cybercrime rely 
heavily on the current open and centralised Internet architecture. A more tightly regulated 
network, with more gateways and intermediaries, may sacrifice the Web’s dynamic nature, 
but may also seriously hinder some forms of cybercrime, particularly denial of service 
attacks, spam and phishing.  
The optimistic view of regulation also presents opportunities for smarter regulatory 
efforts by informing decision-makers and stakeholders about the way in which the target 
system operates. Any attempt to legislate in the areas covered by Internet regulation, such as 
privacy, copyright and cybercrime, must consider the emergent traits of Cyberspace. At some 
point policymakers will realise that their regulatory efforts are having no effect, and hopefully 
they will look at some of the research highlighted in this work in search of evidence.  
To recap, the self-organisation theory of Internet regulation is as follows: the Internet 
is a complex system that displays self-organisation. In order to efficiently and successfully 
regulate the digital environment, it is imperative that one understands how it is organised, 
what characteristics are present, what elements act as fitness peaks and how architectural 
decisions affect its emergent features.  
V. Epilogue: The Centrality Menace 
On 2 March 2013, an unprecedented (and under-reported) event in the history of the Internet 
took place. A small technical fault arising from a software update took out 785,000 websites 
that use the popular content delivery network CloudFlare for over an hour.67 While some 
downtime is to be expected, what is remarkable about this incident is that it should never have 
happened. The Internet is planned with a very clear idea in mind, and that is resilience. It was 
designed in part to respond to an all-out nuclear strike on the communications infrastructure 
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of the US, and therefore it had a clear design goal that has decentralisation at its core. The 
idea is that all traffic is distributed through other nodes in the network, so if any individual 
node is knocked down, then traffic should be able to be re-directed through another pathway. 
The CloudFlare outage was possible because the modern Internet is starting to ignore and 
bypass this very basic rule for convenience purposes. We are increasingly seeing more 
centralisation as part of the network, and this spells trouble not just from a technical 
standpoint, but also with respect to how we are sleepwalking into a more centralised, more 
regulated, and less open global network.  
Anyone who is aware of the decentralised nature of the Internet will undoubtedly be 
worried that the ideal of decentralisation is fast becoming a thing of the past. The Snowden 
revelations have uncovered an Internet that is highly centralised; a few countries and a 
handful of private companies have a disproportionate amount of power with regards to its 
architecture. The Cambridge Analytica68 debacle gave us a glimpse into the level of 
centralisation that private entitites have accumulated. 
The study of Internet regulation in the next few years will have to tackle the growing 
levels of centrality. Many people, including this author, still believe that the distributed and 
open Internet is a worthy cause to support. Besides the common fear of government presence 
in online communities, exemplified by the ideology of cyber-libertarianism, we need to take a 
hard look at the way in which the Internet has become a sizeable business, and how a few 
companies command a disproportionate amount of power. These companies no longer 
respond to self-imposed promises not to be evil; their reason for existing is to make a profit.69 
The Snowden revelations have uncovered a public-private conglomerate of gigantic 
proportions, with the US Government and many US-based companies at the centre. Each new 
revelation has uncovered layers of collaboration that many suspected, but the reality seems to 
surpass even the worst conspiracy theories.  
Internet regulation theories must tackle these issues head on.70   
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